Does competition among persuaders increase the extent of information revealed? We study ex ante symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to gather and communicate to a receiver, who takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. We characterize the information revealed in pure-strategy equilibria. We consider three ways of increasing competition among senders: (i) moving from collusive to non-cooperative play, (ii) introducing additional senders, and (iii) decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences. For each of these notions, we establish that increasing competition cannot decrease the amount of information revealed, and in a certain sense tends to increase it.
Introduction
Does competition among persuaders increase the amount of information revealed? A long tradition in political and legal thought holds that the answer is yes. 1 This view has motivated protection of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, 2 media ownership regulation, 3 the adversarial judicial system, 4 and many other policies.
Nevertheless, as Sobel (2010) emphasizes, existing models of strategic communication with multiple senders provide an incomplete account of the link between competition and information.
Most papers focus on possibility results rather than characterizing the full set of equilibria. They typically compare outcomes with one sender to outcomes with two or more, but provide no guidance on other comparative statics, such as the effect of moving from few to many senders. And existing results are often sensitive to technical conditions such whether the set of the receiver's actions is bounded or unbounded.
We introduce a new model that yields a novel set of robust intuitions about the effect of competition. Several senders, who have no ex ante private information, simultaneously conduct costless experiments about an unknown state of the world in an attempt to persuade a third party (Receiver) to change her action. Receiver observes the results of these experiments and then takes a non-contractible action that affects the welfare of all players. The state space is arbitrary but finite.
Receiver and each of the senders have arbitrary, state-dependent, utility functions. Throughout the paper we focus on pure-strategy equilibria of the game. 5 The information revealed in an equilibrium of this game can be succinctly summarized by the distribution of Receiver's posterior beliefs (Blackwell 1953) . We refer to such a distribution as an outcome of the game and order outcomes by informativeness according to the usual Blackwell 1 Milton (1644 1 Milton ( /2006 Mill (1859 Mill ( /2006 . 2 Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) ; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) . 3 Federal Communications Commission (2003) . 4 Sward (1988) . 5 In Section 4, we briefly discuss the complications that arise with mixed strategies.
criterion.
We begin our analysis by establishing a simple lemma that is the backbone of our main propositions: if the senders other than i together induce some outcome τ , sender i can unilaterally deviate to induce some other outcome τ if and only if τ is more informative than τ . The "only if" part of this lemma is trivial, and captures a basic property of information: an individual sender may unilaterally increase the amount of information being revealed, but can never decrease it below the informational content of the other senders' signals. The "if" part of the lemma is more substantive, and depends on the assumption that senders have access to a rich set of possible signals. It implies that no outcome can be a pure-strategy equilibrium if there exists a more informative outcome preferred by any sender. This property is the fundamental reason why competition tends to increase information revelation in our model.
Our main characterization result provides an algorithm for finding the full set of pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes. We consider each sender i's value function over Receiver's beliefsv i and its concave closure V i (the smallest concave function everywhere abovev i ). Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that a single sender i = 1 can benefit from providing additional information to Receiver if and only ifv 1 = V 1 at the current belief, and consequently, any belief µ that Receiver holds in equilibrium must satisfyv 1 (µ) = V 1 (µ). We extend this result and establish that, when there are two or more senders, a distribution of posteriors is an equilibrium outcome if and only if every belief µ in its support satisfiesv i (µ) = V i (µ) for all i. Identifying the set of these "unimprovable" beliefs for a given sender is typically straightforward. To find the equilibrium outcomes of the game, one then simply takes the intersection of these sets.
We then turn to the impact of competition on information revelation. We consider three ways of increasing competition among senders: (i) moving from collusive to non-cooperative play, (ii) introducing additional senders, and (iii) decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences. Since there are typically many equilibrium outcomes, we state these results in terms of set comparisons based on the strong and the weak set orders introduced by Topkis (1978) . We show that, for all three notions of increasing competition, more competition never makes the set of outcomes less informative (under either order).
Competition does not necessarily make the set of outcomes more informative, however, because the set of outcomes with more competition T may be non-comparable to the set of outcomes with less competition T . If we restrict attention to comparable outcomes, however, we obtain stronger results. Specifically, we show that for any maximal chain C that intersects T and T , T ∩ C is more informative than T ∩ C. This relationship holds in the strong set order for the comparison of collusive to non-cooperative play, and in the weak set order for the comparisons based on number of senders and preference alignment. We also show that if the game is zero-sum for any subset of senders, full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome whenever the value functions are sufficiently nonlinear.
Finally, we discuss the precise sense in which our results on informativeness imply that competition increases Receiver's welfare. We also discuss an important caveat, namely that when the outcomes under more and less competition are non-comparable, competition may lead to a form of coordination failure that makes Receiver strictly worse off.
Throughout the paper, we assume that Receiver observes the realizations of the senders' signals directly. This simplifies the exposition, but is not necessary for our results. In Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) , we show that the equilibrium outcomes of our game are the same as those of an alternative game where Receiver does not observe the results of senders' experiments directly, but senders have the ability to send verifiable messages. Our results are therefore applicable to settings where senders observe their information privately and have the ability to conceal unfavorable results ex post.
Our paper contributes to three lines of research on multiple-sender communication. Our model is closely related to the multiple-senders persuasion game analyzed in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) .
We build on their results in two directions. First, we allow senders to choose how much information to obtain. Second, Milgrom and Roberts identify restrictive preference conditions under which every equilibrium is fully revealing. In contrast, we derive results on the exact informational content of all equilibria without any assumptions about senders' preferences. 6
Our model is also related to a small literature that examines situations with ex ante symmetric 6 In concurrent work, Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2011) analyze multiple-sender persuasion games when there is uncertainty about whether each sender is informed. Under the assumption that senders' preferences are single-peaked and symmetric, they geometrically characterize the equilibrium strategies. They establish that Receiver's payoff may be maximized when senders have identical, extreme preferences rather than opposed ones. Chen and Olszewski (2011) analyze a model of debate in which two senders with opposed preferences try to convince a receiver. They take senders' information as exogenous and do not consider comparative statics with respect to the extent of competition.
information with multiple senders. Brocas et al. (forthcoming) and Gul and Pesendorfer (forthcoming) examine settings where two senders with exactly opposed interests provide costly signals about a binary state of the world. The main difference between our model and this pair of papers is that we assume signals are costless but consider a more general setting, with an arbitrary state space, arbitrary preferences, and arbitrary signals. Moreover, neither Brocas et al. nor Gul and Pesendorfer examine the impact of increased competition on outcomes since this question is of less interest when senders' preferences are completely opposed. Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) examine a model where schools choose how much information to provide about their students' abilities so as to maximize the students' job placement. The main difference between their paper and ours is that in their setting, each school can only generate information about the quality of its own students, while we assume all senders can generate information about any dimension of the state space. Moreover, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) focus on a different question than we dothey examine whether the amount of information revealed depends on how students' abilities are distributed across schools. Finally, our model relates to the large literature that examines the impact of conflict of interest among senders in cheap talk settings (e.g., Krishna and Morgan 2001; Battaglini 2002) . Most papers in this literature focus on results that establish weak conditions under which a fully revealing equilibrium exists. Since completely uninformative (babbling) equilibria are also always present, and since it is typically infeasible to characterize the full equilibrium set, these models leave open the question of how much revelation we should expect to see in practice. They also focus on comparing outcomes with one sender to outcomes with two or more, and so do not speak to the other comparisons we analyze such as moving from few to many senders.
The next section presents mathematical preliminaries. Section 3 presents the model and the equivalence to the game with verifiable signals. Section 4 presents our main characterization result.
Section 5 presents our key comparative statics. Section 6 presents applications to persuasion in courtrooms and product markets. Section 7 concludes. Let Ω be a finite state space. A state of the world is denoted by ω ∈ Ω. A belief is denoted by µ.
The prior distribution on Ω is denoted by µ 0 . Let X be a random variable that is independent of ω and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with typical realization x. We model signals as deterministic functions of ω and x. Formally, a signal π is a finite partition of Ω × [0, 1] s.t. π ⊂ S, where S is the set of non-empty Lebesgue measurable subsets of Ω × [0, 1]. We refer to any element s ∈ S as a signal realization.
With each signal π we associate an S-valued random variable that takes value s ∈ π when (ω, x) ∈ s. Let p(s|ω) = λ ({x| (ω, x) ∈ s}) and p (s) = ω∈Ω p (s|ω) µ 0 (ω) where λ (·) denotes the Lebesgue measure. For any s ∈ π, p (s|ω) is the conditional probability of s given ω and p (s) is the unconditional probability of s.
Our definition of a signal is somewhat non-standard because we model the source of noise in signal realizations (the random variable X) explicitly. This is valuable for studying multiple senders because for any two signals π 1 and π 2 , our definition pins down not only their marginal distributions on S but also their joint distribution on S × S. The joint distribution is important as it captures the extent to which observing both π 1 and π 2 reveals more information than observing only π 1 or π 2 alone. The more common definition of a signal, which takes the marginal distribution on S conditional on ω as the primitive, leaves the joint informational content of two or more signals unspecified.
Our definition of a signal is illustrated in Figure 1 . In this example, Ω = {L, R} and π = {l, r} 
Lattice structure
The formulation of a signal as a partition has the additional benefit of inducing an algebraic structure on the set of signals. This structure allows us to "add" signals together and thus easily examine their joint information content. Let Π be the set of all signals.
Let denote the refinement order on Π, that is, π 1 π 2 if every element of π 1 is a subset of an element of π 2 . The pair (Π, )
is a lattice. The join π 1 ∨ π 2 of two elements of Π is defined as the supremum of {π 1 , π 2 }. For any finite set (or vector) 7 P we denote the join of all its elements by ∨P . We write π ∨ P for π ∨ (∨P ).
Note that π 1 ∨ π 2 is a signal that consists of signal realizations s such that s = s 1 ∩ s 2 for some s 1 ∈ π 1 and s 2 ∈ π 2 . Hence, π 1 ∨ π 2 is the signal that yields the same information as observing both signal π 1 and signal π 2 . In this sense, the binary operation ∨ "adds" signals together. The join of two signals is illustrated in Figure 2 .
Distributions of posteriors
A distribution of posteriors, denoted by τ , is an element of ∆ (∆ (Ω)) that has finite support.
In the model we introduce below, a strategy profile will be a vector of signals π = (π1, ..., πn) and we will write ∨π for ∨ {πi} n i=1 . 8 The fact that distributions of posteriors have finite support follows from the assumption that each signal has finitely many realizations. The focus on such signals is without loss of generality under the maintained assumption that Ω is finite.
Observing a signal realization s s.t. p (s) > 0 generates a unique posterior belief 9
Note that the expression above does not depend on the signal; observing s from any signal π leads to the same posterior µ s .
Each signal π induces a Bayes-plausible distribution of posteriors. We write π for the distribution of posteriors induced by π. It is easy to see that τ = π assigns probability τ (µ) = {s∈π:µs=µ} p (s) to each µ. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) establish that the image of the mapping · is the set of all Bayes-plausible τ 's: Proof. Given any s s.t. p (s) > 0 and any distribution of posteriors τ s.t. E τ [µ] = µ s , let S be a partition of s constructed as follows. For each ω, let s ω = {x| (ω, x) ∈ s}. Now, partition each
It is easy to check that τ = π|s .
Note that Lemma 1 is a Corollary of Lemma 2 as we can set s in the statement of Lemma 2 to
9 For those s with p (s) = 0, set µs to be an arbitrary belief.
Informativeness
We order distributions of posteriors by informativeness in the sense of Blackwell (1953) . We say that τ is more informative than τ , denoted τ τ , if for some π and π s.t. τ = π and τ = π , there exists a garbling g : S × S → [0, 1] such that s ∈π g (s , s) = 1 for all s ∈ π, and p (s |ω) = s∈π g (s , s) p (s|ω) for all ω and all s ∈ π . The relation is a partial order. The pair (∆ (∆ (Ω)) , ) is a bounded lattice. We refer to the minimum element as no revelation, denoted τ . Distribution τ places probability one on the prior. We refer to the maximum element as full revelation, denoted τ . Distribution τ has only degenerate beliefs in its support. 10
The refinement order on the space of signals implies the informativeness order on the space of distributions of posteriors:
Proof. Define g (s , s) equal to 1 if s ⊂ s , and equal to 0 otherwise. Given any π and π s.t. π π , we know that for each s ∈ π, there is exactly one s ∈ π s.t. s ⊂ s . Hence, for all s, s ∈π g (s , s) = 1. Moreover, π π implies that ∪ {s ∈ π : s ⊂ s } = s . Hence, for any ω and any s ∈ π , {x| (ω, x) ∈ ∪ {s ∈ π : s ⊂ s }} = {x| (ω, x) ∈ s }. This in turn implies
Note that it is not true that π π ⇒ π π . 11 Note also that Lemma 3 implies π 1 ∨ π 2
We establish one more relationship between and .
Lemma 4. For any τ, τ , and π s.t. τ τ and π = τ , ∃π s.t. π π and π = τ .
Proof. Consider any τ, τ , and π s.t. τ τ and π = τ . By Lemma 1, there is aπ such that π = τ . Hence, by definition of , there is a garbling g such that
for all s ∈ π and ω. Define a new signal π π as follows. For each s ∈ π, for each ω ∈ Ω, let s ω = {x| (ω, x) ∈ s}. Now, define a partition of each s ω such that each element of the partition, say s (s,ŝ, ω), is associated with a distinctŝ ∈π and has Lebesgue measure g (s,ŝ) p (ŝ|ω). This 10 A belief is degenerate if it places positive probability only on a single state. 11 For example, suppose that there are two states L and R. π is a perfectly informative signal with two realizations. π is an uninformative signal with ten realizations, each of which is equally likely in state L and state R. Then π π , but π cannot be finer than π because π has more elements.
is possible since the sum of these measures is
which implies π = π = τ .
Note that it is not true that for any τ τ and π = τ , ∃π s.t. π π and π = τ .
Orders on sets
We will frequently need to compare the informativeness of sets of outcomes. Topkis (1978 Topkis ( , 1998 defines two orders on subsets of a lattice. Given two subsets Y and Y of a lattice (Y, ≥), consider two properties of a pair y, y ∈ Y: Given two sets of outcomes T and T , we thus say T is strongly more informative than T if T s T , and T is weakly more informative than T if T w T . Some of our results will establish that a particular set cannot be strictly less informative than another set. To simplify the statement of those propositions, we say that T is no less informative than T if T is not strictly less informative than T in the weak order. As long as T and T are not empty, as will be the case in our application, this implies that T is not strictly less informative than T in the strong order, and it implies that if T and T are strongly (weakly) comparable, then T is strongly (weakly) more informative.
Both the strong and the weak order are partial. Broadly speaking, there are two ways that sets than in the first case, and in some contexts we might be willing to say that Y ∪ỹ is above Y .
In the analysis below, we will frequently encounter sets that fail to be ordered only in the latter sense. It will therefore be useful to distinguish these cases from those where sets are unordered even when we restrict attention to their comparable elements. A chain is a set in which any two elements are comparable, and a chain is maximal if it is not a strict subset of any other chain.
We say that Y is strongly (weakly) above Y along chains if for any maximal chain C ⊂ Y that
To gain more intuition about orders along chains, consider again properties S and W . When 12 Given any two sets Y and Y , the following three statements are equivalent: (i) for any maximal chain C,
13 Function f :Y ×Z → R satisfies the single-crossing property if y > y and z > z implies that
15 We thank John Quah for this observation.
3 Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
The model
Receiver has a continuous utility function u (a, ω) that depends on her action a ∈ A and the state of the world ω ∈ Ω. There are n ≥ 1 senders indexed by i. Each sender i has a continuous utility function v i (a, ω) that depends on Receiver's action and the state of the world. All senders and
Receiver share the prior µ 0 . The action space A is compact.
The game has three stages: Each sender i simultaneously chooses a signal π i from Π. Next, Receiver observes the signal realizations {s i } n i=1 . Finally, Receiver chooses an action.
Receiver forms her posterior using Bayes' rule; hence her belief after observing the signal realizations is µ s where s = ∩ n i=1 s i . She chooses an action that maximizes E µs u (a, ω). It is possible for
Receiver to have multiple optimal actions at a given belief, but for ease of exposition we suppose that Receiver takes a single action a * (µ) at each belief µ. In Section 4 we discuss how our results can be restated to account for the multiplicity of optimal actions.
We denote sender i's expected utility when Receiver's belief is µ byv i (µ):
Throughout the paper, we focus exclusively on pure-strategy equilibria. We denote a strategy profile by π = (π 1 , ..., π n ) and let
We refer to Receiver's equilibrium distribution of posteriors as the outcome of the game. 16 We say a belief µ is induced in an equilibrium if it is in the support of the equilibrium outcome.
Discussion of the model
Our model makes several strong assumptions. Third, it is important that senders do not have any private information at the time they choose their signal. If they did, their choice of the signal could convey information conditional on the signal realization, and this would substantially complicate the analysis.
Fourth, we assume that Receiver is a classical Bayesian who can costlessly process all information she receives. The main import of this assumption is that no sender can drown out the information provided by others, say by sending many useless messages. From Receiver's point of view, the worst thing that any sender can do is to provide no information. Hence, unlike in a setting with costly information processing, our model induces an asymmetry whereby each sender can add to but not detract from the information provided by others.
The four assumptions above not only make the model more tractable, but are required for our main results to hold. We also make several assumptions that are not necessary for the results, but greatly simplify the exposition.
First, we present the model as if there were a single Receiver, but an alternative way to interpret our setting is to suppose there are several receivers j = 1, .., m, each with a utility function u j (a j , ω), with receiver j taking action a j ∈ A j , and all receivers observing the realizations of all senders' signals. Even if each sender's utility v i (a, ω) depends in an arbitrary way on the full vector of receivers'
actions a = (a 1 , ..., a m ), our analysis still applies directly since, from senders' perspective, the situation is exactly the same as if there were a single Receiver maximizing u (a, ω) = m j=1 u j (a j , ω).
Second, it is easy to extend our results to situations where Receiver has private information.
Suppose that, at the outset of the game, Receiver privately observes a realization r from some signal ξ (·|ω). In that case, Receiver's action, a * (s, r), depends on the realization of her private signal and is thus stochastic from senders' perspective. However, given a signal realization s, each sender simply assigns the probability ξ (r|ω) µ s (ω) to the event that Receiver's signal is r and the state is ω. Hence, sender i's expected payoff given
the results then apply directly with respect to the re-formulatedv i 's.
Finally, our model assumes that Receiver directly observes the realizations of senders' signals.
As noted above, however, the results in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) imply that this assumption is not necessary for our results. Gentzkow and Kamenica (2012) study the relationship between games where senders must report their information truthfully and disclosure games where they send verifiable messages. In particular, they consider a disclosure game with the following stages: that the set of pure strategy equilibria of this disclosure game coincides with the set of pure strategy equilibria of the game we study in this paper. 18 Thus, our results are applicable even in settings where senders are able to conceal unfavorable information ex post.
In this section, we characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes. As a first step, consider the set of distributions of posteriors that a given sender can induce given the strategies of the other senders.
It is immediate that he can only induce a distribution of posteriors that is more informative than the one induced by his opponents' signals alone. The following lemma establishes that he can induce any such distribution.
Lemma 5. Given a strategy profile π and a distribution of posteriors τ , for any sender i there exists a π i ∈ Π such that π i ∨ π −i = τ if and only if τ ∨π −i .
Proof. Suppose τ ∨π −i . By Lemma 4, there exists a
The converse follows from Lemma 3.
Lemma 5 depends on our assumption that each sender can choose a signal whose realizations are arbitrarily correlated, conditional on ω, with the signal realizations of the other senders. As a result, when senders play mixed strategies, the analogue of this lemma does not hold -it is possible to construct an example where senders other than i are playing mixed strategiesπ −i , there is a distribution of posteriors τ ∨π −i , and there is no π i such that π i ∨π −i = τ . 19 Consequently, the approach we develop below cannot be used to characterize mixed strategy equilibria.
We next turn to the question of when a given sender would wish to deviate to some more informative τ . For each i, let V i be the concave closure ofv i :
where co (v i ) denotes the convex hull of the graph ofv i . Note that each V i is concave by construction.
In fact, it is the smallest concave function that is everywhere weakly greater thanv i . 20 Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) establish that when there is only a single sender i, V i (µ 0 ) is the greatest payoff that the sender can achieve:
19 Here, we extend the notation · to denote the distribution of posteriors induced by a mixed strategy profile. 20 Aumann and Maschler (1995) refer to Vi as the concavification ofvi. 
In light of this lemma, we refer to a belief µ such thatv i (µ) = V i (µ) as unimprovable for sender i. Let M i denote the set of unimprovable beliefs for sender i.
The lemma above establishes that, if there is a single sender, any belief induced in equilibrium has to be unimprovable for that sender. Our main characterization result shows that when n ≥ 2, any belief induced in equilibrium has to be unimprovable for all senders. Moreover, unlike in the single sender case, this condition is not only necessary but sufficient: for any Bayes-plausible τ We provide a sketch of the proof here; a more detailed argument is in the Appendix. Suppose that τ is an equilibrium outcome. If there were some µ ∈ Supp (τ ) such thatv
for some sender i, Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that sender i could profitably deviate by providing additional information when the realization of τ is µ. Conversely, suppose that τ is a Bayes-plausible distribution of beliefs such that for each µ ∈ Supp (τ ),v i (µ) = V i (µ) for all i. Consider the strategy profile where all senders send the same signal π with π = τ . No sender can then deviate to induce any τ ≺ τ . Moreover, the fact that all beliefs in the support of τ are unimprovable means that no sender would want to deviate to any τ τ . Thus, this strategy profile is an equilibrium.
An important feature of Proposition 1 is that it provides a way to solve for the informational content of equilibria simply by inspecting each sender's preferences in turn, without worrying about fixed points or strategic considerations. This is particularly useful because identifying the set of unimprovable beliefs for each sender is typically straightforward. In Section 6, we will use this characterization to develop some applications. For now, Figure Recall that, for ease of exposition, we have been taking some optimal a * (·) as given and focusing on the game between senders. Proposition 1 thus characterizes the set of equilibrium outcomes consistent with this particular strategy by Receiver. To take the multiplicity of Receiver-optimal strategies into account, we could define a separate set of value functionsv α i (µ) for each Receiveroptimal strategy α. Then, a distribution of posteriors τ is an equilibrium outcome if and only if there is an optimal action strategy α such that the support of τ lies in
Finally, observe that full revelation is an equilibrium in the example of Figure 3 (both µ = 0 and µ = 1 are in M ). This is true whenever there are multiple senders, because degenerate beliefs are always unimprovable. This also implies that an equilibrium always exists. 21
Corollary 1. If n ≥ 2, full revelation is an equilibrium outcome.
As Sobel (2010) discusses, the existence of fully revealing equilibria under weak conditions is a common feature of multi-sender strategic communication models. In many of these models, as in ours, full revelation can be an equilibrium outcome even if all senders have identical preferences and strictly prefer no information disclosure to all other outcomes -a seemingly unappealing prediction.
One response would be to introduce a selection criterion that eliminates such equilibria. Given any two comparable equilibrium outcomes, every sender weakly prefers the less informative one.
Hence, while the appropriate selection criterion might depend on the setting, selection criteria that always pick out a minimally informative equilibrium are appealing. We discuss the implications of such a selection criterion in Section 5.4 below. The approach we take in our formal results, however, is to focus on set comparisons of the full range of equilibrium outcomes.
21 Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) establish existence for the case n = 1. Consider an a * (·) where Receiver takes a Sender-preferred optimal action at each belief. Such an a * (·) guarantees thatvi is upper semicontinuous and thus that an equilibrium exists. An outcome τ is collusive if τ ∈ arg max τ E τ ( v i (µ)). Note that it is without loss of generality to assume that, in choosing the collusive outcome, senders put equal weight on each player's utility; if, say due to differences in bargaining power, the collusive agreement placed weight δ i on sender i, we could simply redefine each v i as δ i v i . 22
Proposition 2. Let T * be the set of equilibrium outcomes and T c the set of collusive outcomes. T * is no less informative than T c . Moreover, T * is strongly more informative than T c along chains.
If there is a single sender, the proposition holds trivially as T * = T c , so suppose throughout this subsection that n ≥ 2. We begin the proof with the following Lemma.
Lemma 7. If τ * ∈ T * , τ c ∈ T c , and τ c τ * , then τ c ∈ T * and τ * ∈ T c .
Proof. Suppose τ * ∈ T * , τ c ∈ T c , and τ c τ * . By Lemma 5, we know
for all i; otherwise, the sender i for whom
i which implies τ * ∈ T c . Now, we know τ c ∈ T * unless there is a sender i and a distribution of
, and τ τ c τ * , this cannot be.
Lemma 7 establishes one sense in which competition increases the amount of information revealed: no non-collusive equilibrium outcome is less informative than a collusive outcome, and no equilibrium outcome is less informative than a non-equilibrium collusive outcome. The lemma also plays a central role in the proof of Proposition 2:
22 Moreover, it is not important that the collusive agreement maximizes the sum rather than the product of senders' payoffs. If we define a collusive outcome as an argmax of E τ max vi (µ) − v 0 i , 0 where v 0 i denotes sender i's "disagreement payoff," Proposition 2 would still hold, with a nearly identical proof. The definition of collusion based on the product of payoffs would be appropriate if firms reached a collusive agreement through Nash bargaining rather than through a merger.
Proof. Suppose T c w T * . To establish that T * is no less informative than T c , we need to show this implies T * w T c . For any τ c ∈ T c , we know by Corollary 1 there exists τ * ∈ T * such that τ * τ c . For any τ * ∈ T * , T c w T * implies there is a τ ∈ T c s.t. τ τ * . By Lemma 7, we must then have τ * ∈ T c . Thus, there is a τ c ∈ T c , namely τ * , s.t. τ c τ * . Now, consider any maximal chain C that intersects T and T . Consider any τ * ∈ T * ∩ C and any τ c ∈ T c ∩ C. By Lemma 7,
Note that the proposition allows for T * to be non-comparable to T c . The two sets can indeed be non-comparable in both the strong and the weak order. We will discuss the importance of these caveats below when we analyze whether competition necessarily makes Receiver better off.
Varying the number of senders
A second way to vary the extent of competition is to compare the set of equilibria with many senders to the set of equilibria with fewer senders. This might be the relevant counterfactual for assessing the impact of lowering barriers to entry on equilibrium advertising in an industry.
Proposition 3. Let T and T be the sets of equilibrium outcomes when the sets of senders are J and J ⊂ J, respectively. T is no less informative than T . Moreover, T is weakly more informative than T if |J | > 1, and weakly more informative than T along chains if |J | = 1.
As suggested by the statement of the proposition, the basic intuition behind this result is somewhat different when we consider a change from many senders to more senders (i.e., when |J | > 1), and when we consider a change from a single sender to many senders (i.e., when |J | = 1)
In the former case, Proposition 1 implies that T ⊂ T . In other words, adding senders causes the set of equilibrium outcomes to shrink. But, Corollary 1 implies that, even as the set of equilibrium outcomes shrinks, full revelation must remain in the set. Hence, loosely speaking, adding senders causes the set of equilibrium outcomes to shrink "toward" full revelation. We formalize this intuition in the following lemma, which will also be useful in proving Proposition 4 below.
Lemma 8. Suppose T and T are sets of outcomes s.t. T ⊂ T and τ ∈ T . Then T is weakly more informative than T .
Proof. Suppose T and T are sets of outcomes s.t. T ⊂ T and τ ∈ T . For any τ ∈ T there exists a τ ∈ T , namelyτ , s.t. τ τ . For any τ ∈ T there exists a τ ∈ T , namely τ , s.t. τ τ .
In the latter case (|J | = 1), the key observation is that no τ ∈ T \ T can be less informative than a τ ∈ T . Otherwise, the single sender in J would prefer to deviate from τ to τ . We now turn to the formal proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. If J is a singleton, the proposition holds trivially, so suppose that |J| ≥ 2. First, consider there case where |J | > 1. By Proposition 1, T ⊂ T , and by Corollary 1, τ ∈ T . Hence, the proposition follows from Lemma 8. Second, consider the case where |J | = 1. Let i denote the sender in J . To establish that T is no less informative than T , we need to show that T w T implies T w T . Suppose T w T . By Corollary 1, for any τ ∈ T , we know there exists τ ∈ T ,
namely τ , such that τ τ . Given any τ ∈ T , T w T implies there is a τ ∈ T s.t. τ τ . But, then it must be the case that τ is also individually optimal for sender i, i.e., τ ∈ T ; otherwise, by Lemma 5, sender i could profitably deviate to τ and hence τ would not be an equilibrium. Now, consider any maximal chain C that intersects T . Since C is maximal, it must include τ . Moreover, τ ∈ T . Hence, for any τ ∈ T ∩ C there is a τ ∈ T ∩ C, namely τ , s.t. τ τ . It remains to show that for any τ ∈ T ∩ C there is a τ ∈ T ∩ C s.t. τ τ . Given any τ ∈ T ∩ C, since C is a chain, every element of T ∩ C is comparable to τ . Consider any τ ∈ T ∩ C. Since T intersects C, there must be some such τ . If τ τ , we are done. Suppose τ τ . Then, it must be the case that τ is also individually optimal for sender i, i.e., τ ∈ T ; otherwise, by Lemma 5, sender i could profitably deviate to τ and hence τ would not be an equilibrium.
Varying the alignment of senders' preferences
A third way to vary the extent of the competition is to make senders' preferences more or less aligned. This counterfactual sheds lights on the efficacy of adversarial judicial systems and advocacy more broadly (Dewatripont and Tirole 1999) .
Given that senders can have any arbitrary state-dependent utility functions, the extent of preference alignment among senders is not easy to parametrize in general. Hence, we consider a specific form of preference alignment: given any two functions f, g : A × Ω → R we let v b b∈R + denote a collection of preferences where some two senders, say j and k, have preferences of the form
while preferences of Receiver and of other senders are independent of b. The parameter b thus captures the extent of preference misalignment between two of the senders. 
Combining these two inequalities, we get
This last inequality implies E
. Since these two inequalities hold for any τ s.t. E τ [µ ] = µ, we know µ ∈M .
Hence,M ⊂M . Therefore, since M i = M i for all i / ∈ {j, k}, we know M ⊂ M . This in turn implies T ⊂ T . By Corollary 1, we know τ ∈ T . Hence, the proposition follows directly from Lemma 8.
Note that proofs of both Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 rely on the fact that, as competition increases (whether through adding senders or increasing misalignment of their preferences), the set of equilibrium outcomes shrinks. This is worth noting since it suggests another sense, not fully captured by the propositions, in which competition increases information revelation. Specifically, T ⊂ T implies that the set of unimprovable beliefs is smaller when there is more competition; hence, with more competition there are fewer prior beliefs such that no revelation is an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 4 establishes that as preference misalignment b grows, the set of equilibrium outcomes shrinks and the extent of information revealed in equilibrium increases. A natural conjecture, therefore, may be that in the limit where two senders have fully opposed preferences, full revelation becomes the only equilibrium.
Specifically, suppose there are two senders j and k s.t. v j = −v k . Does the presence of two such senders guarantee full revelation? It turns out the answer is no. For example, ifv j is linear, and j and k are the only 2 senders, then M j = M k = ∆ (Ω) and any outcome is an equilibrium.
Moreover, it will not be enough to simply assume thatv j is non-linear; as long as it is linear along some dimension of ∆ (Ω), it is possible to construct an equilibrium that is not fully revealing along that dimension. Accordingly, we say thatv j is fully non-linear if it is non-linear along every edge of ∆ (Ω), i.e., if for any two degenerate beliefs µ ω and µ ω , there exist two beliefs µ l and µ h on the
is fully non-linear, then full revelation is indeed the unique equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 5 establishes the analogous result for the more general case where there is some subset of senders for whom the game is zero-sum.
Proposition 5. Suppose there is a subset of senders J ⊂ {1, ..., n} s.t. (i) for any a and ω, i∈J v i (a, ω) = 0, and (ii) there exists i ∈ J s.t.v i is fully non-linear. Then, full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome.
Does competition make Receiver better off ?
Propositions 2, 3, and 4 establish a sense in which moving from collusion to non-cooperative play, adding senders, and making senders' preferences less aligned all tend to increase information revelation. Since more information must weakly increase Receiver's utility, increasing competition thus tends to make Receiver better off.
To make this observation more precise, we translate our set comparisons of the informativeness of outcomes into set comparisons of Receiver's utilities. Given two lattices (Y, ) and (Z, ≥), a function f : Y → Z is said to be increasing if y y implies f (y) ≥ f (y ). Moreover, if the domain of f is a chain, then an increasing f preserves the set order:
Proof. First consider the strong order. Consider any y ∈ f (T ) and y ∈ f (T ). If y ≥ y , then y ∨ y ∈ f (T ). Suppose y > y. Let τ and τ be any elements of f −1 (y) ⊂ T and f −1 (y ) ⊂ T , respectively. Since f is increasing and y > y , we know τ > τ . Hence, since T T , it must be the case that τ ∈ T . Hence, y ∧ y = y = f (τ ) ∈ f (T ). Now consider the weak order. Given
Since f is increasing, y ≥ y . Given y ∈ f (T ), consider any τ ∈ f −1 (y ). Since T w T there is
By Blackwell's Theorem (1953) , the function f u : (∆ (∆ (Ω)) , ) → (R, ≥), which maps distributions of posteriors into the expected utility of a decision-maker with a utility function u, is increasing for any u. Hence, Lemma 9 allows us to translate the results of the previous three subsections into results about Receiver's payoff.
Corollary 2. Let T * be the set of equilibrium outcomes and T c be the set of collusive outcomes.
Let T and T be the sets of equilibrium outcomes when the sets of senders are J and J ⊂ J, By the definition of Blackwell informativeness, Corollary 2 applies not only to Receiver, whom senders are trying to influence, but also to any third-party who observes the signal realizations and whose optimal behavior depends on ω. 23
An alternative to comparing sets of Receiver's payoffs is to consider a selection criterion that picks out a particular outcome from the overall set. As mentioned in Section 4, selection criteria that always pick out a minimally informative equilibrium may be appealing. Under any such criterion, there is a strong sense in which competition makes Receiver better off. Proposition 2 implies that any minimally informative equilibrium gives Receiver a weakly higher payoff than any comparable 23 In the statement of Corollary 2, we do not need to assume that C intersects T * or T c because an empty set is strongly above and below any set and we do not need to assume that C intersects T , T b , or T b because all these sets containτ so any maximal chain must intersect them. collusive outcome. Propositions 3 and 4 imply that any minimally informative equilibrium with more senders or less aligned preferences gives Receiver a weakly higher payoff than any comparable minimally informative equilibrium with fewer senders or more aligned sender preferences.
Whether we consider the entire equilibrium set or a particular selection rule, however, our results apply only to mutually comparable outcomes. This is a substantive caveat. If the outcomes under more and less competition are non-comparable, it is possible that the outcome with more competition makes Receiver worse off. 
Applications

A criminal trial
In Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) , we introduce the example of a prosecutor trying to persuade a judge that a defendant is guilty. Here, we extend that example to include two senders, a prosecutor (p) and a defense attorney (d).
There are two states, innocent (ω = 0) and guilty (ω = 1). The prior is Pr (ω = 1) = µ 0 = 0.3.
Receiver (the judge) can choose to either acquit (a = 0) or convict (a = 1). Receiver's utility is u (a, ω) = I {a=ω} . The prosecutor's utility is v p (a, ω) = a. The defense attorney's utility is
If the prosecutor were playing this game by himself, his optimal strategy would be to choose a signal that induces a distribution of posteriors with support 0, 1 2 that leads 60% of defendants to be convicted. If the defense attorney were playing this game alone, his optimal strategy would be to gather no information, which would lead the judge to acquit everyone. Because v p + v d = 0, all outcomes in this game are collusive outcomes.
When the attorneys compete, the unique equilibrium outcome is full revelation. This follows directly from Proposition 5, since v p = −v d and thev i 's are fully non-linear. Thus, the set of equilibrium outcomes is strongly more informative than both the set of collusive outcomes and the outcomes each sender would implement on their own, consistent with Propositions 2 and 3. In this example, competition clearly makes Receiver better off.
To make the analysis more interesting, we can relax the assumption that the two senders' preferences are diametrically opposed. In particular, suppose that the defendant on trial is a confessed terrorist. Suppose that the only uncertainty in the trial is how the CIA extracted the defendant's confession: legally (ω = 1) or through torture (ω = 0). Any information about the CIA's methods released during the trial will be valuable to terrorist organizations; the more certain they are about whether the CIA uses torture or not, the better they will be able to optimize their training methods. Aside from the attorneys' respective incentives to convict or acquit, both prefer to minimize the utility of the terrorists.
Specifically, we assume there is a second receiver, a terrorist organization. 24 The organization must choose a fraction a T ∈ [0, 1] of its training to devote to resisting torture. The organization's utility is u T (a T , ω) = − (1 − a T − ω)
2 . The attorneys' utilities are v p (a, ω) = a − cu T and 4, 25] captures the social cost of terrorism internalized by the attorneys. 25
24 As discussed in Section 3.2, our model is easily reinterpreted to allow multiple receivers. 25 If c < 4, the outcome is the same as when c = 0; the preferences of the two senders are sufficiently opposed that 
, 1 . The set of equilibrium outcomes is the set of τ 's whose support lies in this M .
Competition between the attorneys increases information revelation. The set of equilibrium outcomes is strongly more informative than both the set of collusive outcomes (cf: Proposition 2) and than what either sender would reveal on his own (cf: Proposition 3). Moreover, when the extent of shared interest by the two attorneys is greater, i.e., when c is greater, the set of equilibrium outcomes becomes weakly less informative (cf: Proposition 4).
Advertising of quality by differentiated firms
There are two firms i ∈ {1, 2} which sell differentiated products. The prices of these products are fixed exogenously and normalized to one, and marginal costs are zero. The uncertain state ω is a two-dimensional vector whose elements are the qualities of firm 1's product and firm 2's product.
Receiver is a consumer whose possible actions are to buy neither product (a = 0), buy firm 1's product (a = 1), or buy firm 2's product (a = 2) . We interpret the senders' choice of signals as a choice of verifiable advertisements about quality. 26
There are three possible states: (i) both products are low quality (ω = (−5, −5)), (ii) firm 1 s product is low quality and firm 2's product is high quality (ω = (−5, 5)), or (iii) both products are high quality (ω = (5, 5)). Let µ 1 = Pr (ω = (−5, 5)) and µ 2 = Pr (ω = (5, 5)).
The firms' profits are v 1 = I {a=1} and v 2 = I {a=2} . Receiver is a consumer whose utility depends full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome. If c > 25, both senders are so concerned about giving information to the terrorists that neither wishes to reveal anything. 26 Note that in this setting, our model allows for firms' advertisements to provide information about the competitor's product as well as their own. This is a reasonable assumption in certain industries. For example, pharmaceutical companies occasionally advertise clinical trials showing unpleasant side-effects or delayed efficacy of a rival product.
on a, ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) and privately observed shocks = ( 0 , 1 , 2 ) : 27
We assume that the elements of are distributed i.i.d. type-I extreme value. Senders' expected payoffs at belief µ are thusv
. Competition between the firms increases information revelation. The set of equilibrium outcomes is weakly more informative than what either firm would reveal on its own (cf: Proposition 3).
Although not immediately apparent from Figure 5 , the set of equilibrium outcomes is also weakly more informative than the set of collusive outcomes, and is strongly so along chains (cf: Proposition 2). The functional form of senders' utilities does not allow us to apply Proposition 4.
To understand the set of equilibria in this example, it is useful to consider the following two simpler settings. First, suppose µ 1 = 0, so the only possible states are ω = (−5, −5) and ω = (5, 5).
In this case, the two firms' preferences are aligned: they both want to convince the consumer that ω = (5, 5). The equilibrium outcomes, which one can easily identify by looking at the µ 2 -edges in panel (c), involve partial information revelation. Next, suppose µ 2 = 0, so the only possible states are ω = (−5, −5) or ω = (−5, 5). Here, senders' preferences are opposed: sender 2 would like to convince Receiver that ω = (−5, 5), while sender 1 would like to convince the consumer that ω = (−5, −5). The unique equilibrium outcome, which one can easily identify by looking at the 27 As discussed in Section 3.2, our model is easily reinterpreted to allow Receiver to have private information. 
, is full revelation. This is the case even though each firm on its own would prefer a partially revealing signal. 28 Finally, suppose that µ 1 + µ 2 = 1, so the only possible states are ω = (−5, 5) or ω = (5, 5). The firms' preferences are again opposed, and the unique equilibrium outcome, which one can read off the hypotenuses in panel (c), is again full revelation. This is the case despite the fact that firm 1 would strictly prefer no revelation.
In the full three-state example, the equilibrium involves full revelation along the dimensions where senders' preferences are opposed and partial revelation along the dimension where they are aligned. Consequently, the consumer learns for certain whether or not the state is ω = (−5, 5), but may be left uncertain whether the state is ω = (−5, −5) or ω = (5, 5).
Conclusion
In his review of the literature on strategic communication, Sobel (2010) points out that the existing work on multiple senders has largely focused on extreme results, such as establishing conditions that guarantee full revelation is an equilibrium outcome in cheap talk games. He remarks that most of these analyses stop short of fully characterizing the equilibrium set. He also argues that the existing models do not capture the intuition that consulting more than two senders can be helpful even if different senders do not have access to different information.
In this paper, we assume that senders can costlessly choose any signal whatsoever, that their signals can be arbitrarily correlated with those of their competitors, and that Receiver observes all the information that is generated. Under these assumptions, we are able to address some of Sobel's concerns. We provide a simple way to identify the full set of pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes.
We show that under quite general conditions competition cannot reduce the amount of information revealed in equilibrium, and in a certain sense tends to increase it. We also discuss the limitations of these results, in particular the fact that when outcomes with more and less competition are informationally non-comparable, an increase in competition can potentially be harmful.
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 10. For any sender i and any distribution of posteriors τ :
Proof. Consider any i and any τ s.t.v i (µ) = V i (µ) ∀µ ∈ Supp (τ ). Consider any τ τ and π such that π = τ . For any s s. With Lemma 10, it is straightforward to establish Proposition 1.
Proof. Suppose n ≥ 2. Supposev i (µ) = V i (µ) ∀i ∀µ ∈ Supp (τ ). By Lemma 1, there is a π such that π = τ . Consider the strategy profile π where π i = π ∀i. Since n ≥ 2, we know that ∨π −i = ∨π. Hence, for any π i ∈ Π we have π i ∨ π −i = π i ∨ π ∨π. Hence, by Lemma 3, π i ∨ π −i ∨π . Lemma 10 thus implies E ∨π v i (µ) ≥ E π i ∨π −i v i (µ) . Hence, π is an equilibrium.
Conversely, consider any equilibrium π. Consider any τ ∨π . By Lemma 5, for any sender i there exists π i ∈ Π such that π i ∨ π −i = τ . Since π is an equilibrium, this means E ∨π [v i (µ)] ≥ [E τ v i (µ)] for all i. Lemma 10 then implies thatv i (µ) = V i (µ) ∀i ∀µ ∈ Supp ( ∨π ).
Proof of Proposition 5
We build the proof through the following three lemmas.
Lemma 11. If there is a subset of senders J ⊂ {1, ..., n} s.t. for any a and ω, i∈J v i (a, ω) = 0, then for any belief µ * induced in an equilibrium, for any τ s.t. E τ [µ] = µ * , we have E τ [v i (µ)] = v i (µ * ) for all j ∈ J.
Proof. Consider J s.t. i∈J v (a, ω) = 0 ∀a, ω and any µ * induced in an equilibrium. We must havê v i (µ * ) = V i (µ * ) ∀i, and thus, by Lemma 6, E τ [v i (µ)] −v i (µ * ) ≤ 0 ∀i. We also have i∈Jv (µ) = 0 ∀µ, which implies i∈J E τ [v i (µ)] = 0. Hence, i∈J [E τ [v i (µ)] −v i (µ * )] = 0 ∀i ∈ J. Combining this with the earlier inequality, we obtain that E τ [v i (µ)] −v i (µ * ) = 0 ∀i ∈ J.
Lemma 12. Ifv j is non-linear, for any µ * ∈ int (∆ (Ω)) there exists a τ s.t. E τ [µ] = µ * and
Proof. Ifv j is non-linear, there exist {µ t } T t=1 and weights β t s.t. β tvj (µ t ) =v j ( t β t µ t ). Consider any µ * ∈ int (∆ (Ω)). There exists some µ l and γ ∈ [0, 1) s.t. µ * = γµ l + (1 − γ) β t µ t .
Ifv j (µ * ) = γv i (µ l ) + (1 − γ) β tvj (µ t ), we are done. So, suppose thatv j (µ * ) = γv j (µ l ) +
(1 − γ) β tvi (µ t ). Now, consider the distribution of posteriors τ equal to µ l with probability γ and equal to belief β t µ t with probability 1 − γ. We have that E τ [µ] = µ * andv j (µ * ) = γv j (µ l ) + (1 − γ) β tvj (µ t ) = γv j (µ l ) + (1 − γ)v j ( β t µ t ) = E τ [v j (µ)].
Lemma 13. Ifv j is fully non-linear, then the restriction ofv j to any n-dimensional face of ∆ (Ω)
is non-linear if n ≥ 1.
Proof. The definition of fully non-linear states that the restriction ofv j to any 1-dimensional face of ∆ (Ω) is non-linear. For any n ≥ 1, every n-dimensional face of ∆ (Ω) includes some (n − 1)-dimensional face of ∆ (Ω) as a subset. Hence, if the restriction ofv j to every (n − 1)-dimensional face is non-linear, so is the restriction ofv j to every n-dimensional face. Hence, by induction on n, the restriction ofv j to any n-dimensional face of ∆ (Ω) is non-linear if n ≥ 1.
With these lemmas, the proof of Proposition 5 follows easily.
Proof. Suppose there is a subset of senders J ⊂ {1, ..., n} s.t. the conditions of the proposition hold. Let j be the sender in J for whomv j is fully non-linear. Let µ * be a belief induced in an equilibrium. Lemmas 11 and 12 jointly imply that µ * must be at the boundary of ∆ (Ω). Hence, µ * is on some n-dimensional face of ∆ (Ω) . But, by Lemma 13, if n > 0, the restriction ofv j to this n-dimensional face is non-linear. Hence, Lemmas 11 and 12 imply that µ * must be on the boundary of this n-dimensional face, i.e., it must be on some (n − 1)-dimensional face. Since this holds for all n > 0, we know that µ * must be on a zero-dimensional face, i.e., it must be an extreme point of ∆ (Ω). Hence, any belief induced in an equilibrium is degenerate.
